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Abstract
We explore an equilibrium model of games where players’ choice behavior
is given by logit response functions, but their payoff responsiveness is het-
erogeneous. We extend the definition of quantal response equilibrium to
this setting, calling it heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium (HQRE),
and prove existence under weak conditions. We generalize HQRE to allow
for limited insight, in which players can only imagine others with low re-
sponsiveness. We identify a formal connection between this new equilibrium
concept, called truncated quantal response equilibrium (TQRE), and the
Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model. We show that CH can be approximated
arbitrarily closely by TQRE. We report a series of experiments comparing
the performance of QRE, HQRE, TQRE and CH. A surprise is that the fit of
the models are quite close across a variety of matrix and dominance-solvable
asymmetric information betting games. The key link is that in the QRE
approaches, strategies with higher expected payoffs are chosen more often
than strategies with lower expected payoff. In CH this property is not built
into the model, but generally holds true in the experimental data.
JEL classification numbers: 024, 026
Key words: experimental economics, quantal response equilibrium, cogni-
tive hierarchy, behavioral game theory
1 Introduction
Rationality limits have been incorporated into behavioral game theories in at
least two major directions.1 “Quantal response equilibrium” (QRE) main-
tains the assumption of equilibrium, in that beliefs are statistically accurate,
but relaxes the assumption that players choose best responses.2 On the other
hand, the “Cognitive hierarchy” (CH) theory relaxes the equilibrium assump-
tion, by assuming that some players do not correctly anticipate what others
will do, but retains the assumption of best responding to beliefs. QRE and
CH approaches both generate statistical predictions with full support, and
have been used successfully to explain deviations from Nash equilibrium in
many types of experiments. This paper introduces a heterogeneous form of
QRE, called HQRE, and shows that special forms of HQRE are closely re-
lated to some forms of CH, thus establishing a link between the two theories.
This paper makes a theoretical contribution and an empirical contribu-
tion. The theoretical contribution is the introduction of HQRE and estab-
lishing the link between QRE and CH. In HQRE, players may have different
sensitivities λi to expected payoff differences across actions, parameterized
by a distribution across players, f(λ). One possibility is that f(λ) is com-
mon knowledge. A more general possibility, called subjective HQRE, allows
players with different values of λi to have different beliefs, f(λ|λi), about the
distribution of others’ parameters. An important special case of subjective
HQRE is Truncated HQRE (TQRE), in which a player i with a parameter
λi truncates the distribution f(λ) at an upper bound of θλi (where θ reflects
the amount of “imagination”). When θ = 1, players all think that nobody
is more responsive than they are, whatever their actual responsiveness. This
truncated HQRE theory corresponds quite closely to some types of cogni-
tive hierarchy theories. In particular, a limiting case of a discretized form of
truncated HQRE closely approximates the CH theory of Camerer, Ho, and
Chong (2004).
The empirical contribution is new experimental data from a variety of
games to analyze the differential predictions of QRE, HQRE, TQRE, and
CH, comparing their ability to explain our data. Surprisingly, there is very
1Learning models explore a different kind of rationality limit than the static models
considered here (see Camerer (2004), chapter 6).
2A purer interpretation is that players do best respond, but that their expected pay-
offs include a disturbance term which is unobserved by the econometrician, but whose
distribution is commonly known.
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little empirical difference in fit of these approaches across the games we study.
We trace this similarity to a property which is built directly into QRE, that
strategies which lead to more costly deviations from optimal play are chosen
less frequently. This property is not guaranteed by the CH approach but it
appears to often hold in these data. Thus, there is a surprising similarity
in what the QRE and CH approaches predict about the relation between
strategy frequency and expected costs, even though their structures are quite
different, indeed, they are opposite in a certain sense.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines HQRE. The next section
generalizes HQRE to allow for subjectivity and truncation in the beliefs of
others’ types. Then we introduce the CH approach, highlight its essential
features, and formally describe the link between CH and TQRE. Our exper-
imental design is described in Section 4. Section 5 reports the experimental
data, and contains an empirical analysis of the fit of the models. Some exten-
sions to the theoretical framework are added in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
concludes.
2 HQRE
We explore a logit QRE model where players’ choice behavior follows logit
quantal response functions but there is heterogeneity with respect to the
responsiveness parameter.3 We now present the model for games in strategic
form, following the approach of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). We discuss
at the end how this approach can be extended to general quantal response
functions, and to the case of behavioral strategies for games in extensive
form.
Let Γ = [N, {Ai}ni=1, {ui}ni=1] be a game in strategic form, where N =
{1, ..., n} is the set of players, Ai = {ai1, . . . , aiJi} is i’s action set and ui :
A → < is i’s payoff function, where A = A1 × · · · × An. Let ∆Ai denote
the set of probability distributions over Ai and let ∆A = ∆A1 × · · ·× ∆An
denote the product set of probability distributions over Ai, i = 1, ..., n. If
α ∈ ∆A, then player i’s expected payoff is denoted by:
Ui(α) =
∑
a∈A
(Πnk=1αk(ak))ui(a).
3Our approach and main theoretical results would extend to the general framework of
regular quantal response equilibrium studied by Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2005).
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and we denote the expected payoff to player i from using action aij ∈ Ai by:
Uij(α) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(Πk 6=iαk(ak))ui(aij, a−i).
Each player is independently assigned by nature a response sensitivity, λi,
drawn from a fixed distribution, Fi(λi), with smooth density function, f , full
support on [0,∞) and finite moments – for example, f could be the density
function for an exponential or log normal distribution. We call λi i’s type.
Quantal response functions are logit transformations of expected payoffs, so
if i has type λi and the actions have expected payoffs Ui = (Ui1, ..., UiJi),
then the probability of choosing action j is:
pij(λi) =
eλiUij∑Ji
k=1 e
λiUik
(1)
We call any measurable function pi : [0,∞)→ ∆Ai a strategy for player i.
The assumption in HQRE is that Fi(λi) is common knowledge, but i’s
type, λi, is private information known only to i. Given some fixed pro-
file of expected payoffs to i, Ui = (Ui1, . . . , UiJi), equation (??) implies a
choice probability function that depends on λi, which we denote by pi(λi) =
[pi1(λi), . . . , piJi(λi)]. Therefore, given i’s profile of choice probability func-
tions, pi(·), the ex ante probability i chooses action j (i.e., before λi is drawn)
is:
σij(p) =
∫ ∞
0
pij(λ)fi(λ)dλ (2)
Following Harsanyi (1973), we call σi = (σi1, . . . , σiJi) i’s induced mixed strat-
egy. Given σ−i, the induced mixed strategy profile of all players other than
i, i’s expected payoffs, Ui(σ−i) = (Ui1, ..., UiJi), can be expressed as:
Uij(σ) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
Πnk 6=iσk(ak)
)
ui(aij, a−i). (3)
In a heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium with logit response func-
tions, equations (??),(??), and (??) must all be satisfied simultaneously.
This leads to the following
Definition 1 p∗ is a Heterogeneous Logit Equilibrium if:
p∗ij(λi) =
eλiUij(σ(p
∗))∑Ji
k=1 e
λiUik(σ(p∗))
for all i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., J i and λi ∈ [0,∞).
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This captures the idea that in HQRE players have rational expectations
about the distribution of mixed strategies, and these will then be self-fulfilling
given the commonly known distribution of profiles of quantal response func-
tions. Therefore, like Nash equilibrium, the solution to the problem is a
fixed point of a mapping from choice probabilities to choice probabilities.
The Appendix proves existence of HQRE for the logit case, using a fixed
point theorem. Note that if each Fi(λi) has a common single mass point,
4
then HQRE is the same as QRE with a common response parameter λ for
all players.
Theorem 1. In finite games, a Heterogeneous Logit Equilibrium exists.
Proof: See appendix.
3 Subjective HQRE
In this section, we consider a more general model which allows expectations
about choice probabilities to be inconsistent with the actual choice frequen-
cies of the other players. Models with this property could prove useful in
explaining behavior in one-shot games, or complex games in which learning
or other forces have not enabled beliefs to fully equilibrate to actual choices.
However, the particular form of inconsistencies allowed in subjective HQRE
still permit it to be thought of as an equilibrium model: choice probabil-
ities conditional on type are common knowledge; it is only the perceived
distribution of types that varies across players.
We replace the rational expectation assumptions by an assumption of
subjective expectations. According to this model, the equilibrium strategies5
of all players are common knowledge in equilibrium, but players have differ-
ent beliefs about the type distributions. Denote the conditional subjective
beliefs of player i about the type of player k by F ik(λk|λi). Note that beliefs
generally depend on a player’s own type.6 As we show later in the sec-
tion, this provides a framework for linking HQRE approaches with cognitive
hierarchy approaches, which share a similar feature of belief heterogeneity.
This difference in beliefs results in equilibrium strategies (and induced mixed
4While the assumptions of the Fi above preclude this case, it can be approximated
arbitrarily closely by Fi that do satisfy the assumptions.
5Recall that strategies are maps from type to choice probabilities.
6If F ik(λk|λi) = Fk(λ)k) for all i, k, λi, λk then subjective HQRE is the same as HQRE.
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strategies) that in general are different from those in a heterogeneous logit
equilibrium.
The notation is similar to that used earlier, but the induced mixed strate-
gies are more complicated. Recall that the role of induced mixed strategies
is to compute U . That is, induced mixed strategies represent the beliefs
players other than i have about i’s action choice, without knowing i’s type.
Under subjective HQRE, players do not share a common prior about F and
therefore do not share identical beliefs about action choices.
As before, for any subjective belief about action profiles, σ̂ ∈ ∆A, player
i’s expected payoff is given by:
Ui(σ̂) =
∑
a∈A
(Πnk=1σ̂k(ak)) ui(a).
and the (subjective) expected payoff to player i from using action aij ∈ Ai
is:
Uij(σ̂) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(Πk 6=iσ̂k(ak)) ui(aij, a−i).
With logit response functions, if i has type λi and the actions by i have
expected payoffs Ui = (Ui1, ..., UiJi), then the probability of i choosing action
j as a function of λi is:
pij(λi;Ui) =
eλiUij∑Ji
k=1 e
λiUik
(4)
We call any measurable function pi : [0,∞) → ∆Ai a strategy for player i.
Hence given some fixed vector of expected payoffs to i, Ui = (Ui1, ..., UiJi),
equation ?? implies an induced mixed strategy for i that depends on λi:
pi(λi) = [pi1(λi), ..., piJi(λi)].
We next turn to the induced mixed strategies. Because of the different
subjective beliefs about the distribution of λ, players k and k′ can have
different beliefs about the induced mixed strategy of player i. However, we
assume that any differences in their beliefs about i’s mixed strategy are due
to differences in beliefs about the distribution of λi. That is, the strategy
profile, p, is assumed to be common knowledge (hence we refer to this as
an equilibrium model). We denote type λk of player k’s belief about player
i’s induced mixed strategy by σki (pi). Therefore, given i’s strategy, pi(·), the
belief of player k that player i will choose action j (i.e., before λi is drawn)
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is:
σkij(pi|λk) =
∫ ∞
0
pij(λi)f
k
i (λk|λk)dλi (5)
Given σi−i(p−i|λi), the beliefs of type λi of player i about the induced mixed
strategy profile of all players other than i, type λi of player i’s expected
payoffs, Uλii (σ
i
−i) = (U
λi
i1 , ..., U
λi
iJi
), are simply:
Uλiij (σ
i
−i) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
(
Πnk 6=iσ
i
k(ak|λi)
)
ui(aij, a−i). (6)
In a subjective HQRE with logit response functions, equations ??,??, and
?? must all be satisfied simultaneously. This leads to the following
Definition 2 p∗ is a Subjective Heterogeneous Logit Equilibrium if:
p∗ij(λi) =
eλiU
λi
ij (σ
i(p∗|λi))∑Ji
k=1 e
λiU
λi
ik (σ
i(p∗|λi))
for all i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., Ji and λi ∈ [0,∞).
This definition reflects the idea that in subjective HQRE players have
rational expectations about strategies (that is, a player’s behavior conditional
on his type λ), but may have different beliefs about the distribution of mixed
strategies, which are induced by different beliefs about the distribution of
types λ.7
3.1 Truncated expectations and bounded imagination
Since subjective HQRE is quite general, precision in applying it must come
from additional restrictions on heterogeneity and subjective beliefs (prefer-
ably empirically-plausible ones).8 We do this by introducing “truncated ex-
pectations:” Players act as if they are not aware of the existence of types
who are more rational than some maximum upper bound, and this upper
7Note that subjective HQRE is still an equilibrium notion, in the sense that everyone is
quantal responding given beliefs, and beliefs about strategies (conditional on λ) are correct
and are shared. It is only the common prior assumption about f(λ) that is relaxed.
8Earlier papers have considered variations of subjective HQRE. McKelvey, Palfrey, and
Weber (2000) consider an HQRE model of self-centered subjective beliefs where players
have different λi’s and believe every one else is exactly like them. Weizsacker (2003)
considers a more general model, where the players still have point beliefs, but these beliefs
are not necessarily self-centered.
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bound may depend on their own type. Given their truncated beliefs, they
form expectations by integrating over their perceived type distribution, just
as in HQRE.
One way to operationalize subjective HQRE is to assume that there is
an upper bound on player i’s imagined types of θi(λi), where θi(λi) is com-
monly known. We assume that θi(λi) is uniformly continuous in λi and
for each i there exists θi such that θi(λi) ≤ θiλi for all λi.9 We assume a
modified form of rational expectations, which we call truncated rational ex-
pectations. The beliefs of type λi of player i about λ−i are rooted in the
”true” distribution, but normalized to reflect the missing density: That is,
for λi > 0, the subjective beliefs of i about the type of player j is given by
F ij (λ|λi) = Fj(λ)/Fj(θi(λi)) for λ ∈ [0, θi(λi)] and F ij (λ|λi) = 1 for λ ≥ θi(λi).
This is truncated HQRE, or TQRE. Note that as θi →∞ for all i, the upper
bound on λ is lifted and the model converges to the standard HQRE model.
The parameter, θi can be interpreted as player i’s imagination. Since
θi is finite, this is a model of bounded imagination, in the sense that for
any type λi of player i, all λ−i − types beyond a certain threshold, θiλi, are
unimaginable in the sense that i assigns zero probability to all those higher
types. Notice that if θi > 0, then players who are “better” in the sense
of payoff responsiveness (i.e. higher λi) necessarily also have more accurate
expectations, in the sense that their beliefs are closer to the true distribution
F . Types θi ≈ 0 are almost completely unimaginative in the sense that they
believe all other players are nearly random. Hence these very low types will
act approximately as if they are applying the principle of insufficient reason
to form expectations about the other players’ strategy choices (as do the
level-1 types in the cognitive hierarchy model), and then quantal respond to
these beliefs. If θi(λi) ≤ λi, then we say that players are self-limited, because
they cannot imagine types with higher λ than their own.10 Proving existence
of TQRE requires a slightly different proof than HQRE because different
λ-types have different beliefs about the other players.
Theorem 2. In finite games, a Truncated Heterogeneous Logit Equilibrium
exists.
Proof: See appendix.
9This can be generalized. For example, player i could have private information about
θi, or there could be lower as well as upper bounds.
10These players are overconfident in the sense that they falsely believe they are “better”
responders than the other players.
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There are a number of reasons why truncated beliefs represent a rea-
sonable manner of introducing belief heterogeneity. One rationale is that
players with a low value of λ who can imagine players with higher λ, and
compute what those other players will do, will generally want to switch to
the higher-type behavior. Another rationale is the large body of evidence
showing that people are often overconfident about their relative skill and
prospects, compared to other people.11 A third rationale is computational
complexity: If there are cognitive costs to computing expected payoffs, those
costs increase as players have more other types to consider. The benefits from
more imagination—the expected payoff differential from imagining what a
wider range of types will do—are likely to fall as λ rises, so the truncated
expectations assumption can be seen as a reduced-form model of cost-benefit
calculations which lead players to ignore information that is hard to process
and not too costly to ignore.
3.2 Discretized TQRE: The connection between QRE
and CH
In this section we establish a formal equivalence between a version of TQRE
and CH.
3.2.1 Truncation and Heterogeneity in CH
CH introduces heterogeneity of player types of a much different kind than
HQRE. In CH there is a discrete distribution f(k) of players who do k steps
of thinking, so k indexes strategic sophistication. The choice probabilities for
a k-step player i choosing strategy j are pij(k). A 0-step player randomizes
over her (finite) number of strategies |Ji|, so pij(k) = 1/|Ji|∀j. Note that
these players do not form beliefs or even attend to their payoffs; their presence
is assumed to get the hierarchical process started in a simple way.
Truncation of beliefs in a similar way to TQRE (albeit relative to beliefs
about the distribution of a much different parameter) is the central feature of
the cognitive hierarchy (CH) model of Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004). Play-
ers who do k ≥ 1 steps of thinking form truncated beliefs about the fraction
of h−step types according to gk(h) = f(h)/
∑h
n=0 f(n)∀h < k and gk(h) =
11Kahneman and Tversky (1972) first studied overconfidence, and much work has fol-
lowed.
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0∀h ≥ k. In this specification, players do not imagine that any others are at
their level (or higher), so, in the notation of the TQRE, they effectively have
θ < 1. All postive-step thinkers best respond given their beliefs, so in a two-
player game,12 pij(k) = 1 iff aij = argmaxa
∑k−1
h=0 gk(h)
∑J−i
m=1 pim(h)ui(a, a−im)).
13
The expected choice probabilities for player i implied by the CH model are
given by pij =
∑∞
k=0 pij(k)f(k).
For precision, Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) assume f(k) is Poisson and
estimate the mean of the distribution using data from more than 100 normal-
form games. Other types of hierarchical models have been explored as well.
Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1994) were the first to use strategic
hierarchies to study dominance-solvable ” beauty contest games” and matrix
games, respectively. In Nagel’s approach k−step players think all others do
k− 1 steps of reasoning (i.e., gk(h) = I(h, k− 1) where I(x, y) is an identity
function equalling one if x = y and zero otherwise). Stahl and Wilson’s
limited-step types have the same one-step-below beliefs as in Nagel, but they
also permit equilibrium types and ”worldly” types who maximize against the
empirical distribution of play. Players in these models are typically modelled
as using quantal responses instead of best responses.14
3.2.2 Differences and Similarities between CH and TQRE
The general form of TQRE is different from CH in three distinct ways. First,
the maximum “imagined” type of other players could be equal to, greater
than, or less than a player’s actual type (depending on θi), and this could be a
second source of heterogeneity, whereas in all the CH and related approaches
the imagination parameter for all players is strictly less than 1.15 Second,
12The expressions are more cumbersome to write out with n-player games because the
probabilities of other players’ types have a multinomial distribution with many terms.
Roughly speaking, CH models become hard to compute as the number of players increase,
while QRE models, which require finding a fixed point, become more difficult to compute
as the number of strategies increase.
13If more than one action is a best response they are assumed to randomize equally
across all best responses.
14Recent applications of this approach include Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2005) and
Crawford and Irribiri (2004, 2005).
15The Stahl-Wilson (1994, 1995) and the Costa-Comes and Crawford (2005) specifica-
tions include other types that do not correspond to levels in the thinking hierarchy. If
the maximum imagined type is always less that one’s own type, then the model’s solution
can be computed recursively, as in CH. However, CH runs into conceptual difficulty (in
fact, it is not properly defined) if θ = 1, since then players are aware that others share
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levels of rationality are indexed by λ in TQRE, rather than k, so that types
correspond to increasing payoff responsiveness rather than strategic sophis-
tication. Third, in TQRE, all types exhibit some degree of randomness in
response, reflecting the stochastic choice modelling. In CH all players with
k ≥ 1 best-respond, so the only source of stochastic choice behavior is buried
in the 0−level types.
In spite of these major differences between the two approaches, there a
number of important similarities between the TQRE and CH approaches.
First, both models have heterogeneity of types. Second both models incor-
porate stochastic behavior. Third, they share an important type in common:
the bottom of the food chain (k = 0 or λ = 0); and these lowest types are in
the support of the beliefs of all types. Fourth, both models assume there is
a limit to the rationality of the other players, and this limit is monotonically
increasing in type. Fifth, in both approaches, there is heterogeneity of be-
liefs as well as heterogeneity of types, and these are correlated: higher types
have more accurate beliefs, and these converge to rational expectations about
f(λ) (or f(k)) as λ (or k) increases. Finally, all players are overconfident in
the sense that they underestimate the gamesmanship (be it sophistication or
responsiveness) of the other players.
3.2.3 The formal connection between TQRE and CH
In this section we show that by placing two parametric restrictions on TQRE,
then for any CH model, there exist distributions of types in TQRE that lead
to behavioral predictions that are essentially equivalent to CH. By essentially
equivalent, we mean two things. First we mean that the the equivalence is
in terms of approximations that can be made arbitrarily close; second, the
approximating equilibria in TQRE are unique.
To make this approximation, we first consider distributions such that the
set of λ values is discrete, Lγ = {0, γ, 2γ, ..., kγ, ...}, with grid size γ. Dis-
cretizing the distribution is a small step in practice, because it is usually done
in applications to make numerical computations. A player of type k, is called
a level k player, and has response parameter λ = kγ. We fix the distribution
over k, so that the probabilities of types are f = {f(0), f(1), ...f(k), ...}. This
is simply a discretized HQRE. The HQRE is defined exactly as before, except
for the discrete, distribution of valuations, and existence is easily established.
their level of thinking, and the recursive definition (and computational algorithm) fails.
Instead, fixed point methods are required, as in other equilibrium models.
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The first parametric restriction we place on TQRE is that θi(λ) =
k
k+1
λ
for all i,λ ∈ Lγ. That is, as in CH, that players only recognize lower types,
but otherwise have correct beliefs about the distribution, that is, they cor-
rectly estimate the relative proportions of lower type players. In this version
of TQRE, level 0 players randomize uniformly, for any value of γ. Level 1
players quantal respond using λi = γ · 1, assuming all other players are type
0. Level 2 players quantal respond (using λi = γ ·2), assuming all other play-
ers are type 0 or type 1, with perceived probabilities f(0)
f(0)+f(1)
and f(1)
f(0)+f(1)
,
respectively. Higher-level types are defined iteratively in the obvious way.
This specification is also only slightly different from a discrete heterogeneous
version of QRE – the only difference being truncated vs. untruncated ra-
tional expectations. It is also worth noting that as the grid size becomes
arbitrarily fine (γ → 0), it approximates the truncated HQRE with θ = 1.
In contrast, however, as the grid size k grows (k →∞), then players doing
one or more steps of thinking have unboundedly large values of λ, so their
choices approach best responses, even for low-level (other than level zero)
players. This special form of discretized TQRE converges to a generalized
form of CH in which the type probabilities have the probabilitiy distribution
{f(0), f(1), ...f(k), ...}. A second parametric assumption makes this form
of TQRE identical to CH as it is generally implemented with a Poisson
distribution of types. That is, assume f(k) follows a Poisson distribution,
that is f(k) = τ
k
k!
e−τ . The important link is that TQRE with θ / 1 retains
the continuous types, stochastic choice, and equilibrium elements of HQRE,
but it borrows the downward-looking and Poisson elements of CH.
The formal connection between TQRE and CH is asymptotic in γ. In
particular, for almost all games and almost all values of τ , the aggregate
choice probabilties implied by the γ−TQRE model converge to the aggregate
choice probablilities of CH. This is stated formally in the following Theorem.
Fix τ . Denote the CH choice probability that level k of player i chooses
action j by pτijk, and denote the γ − TQRE choice probability (and f dis-
tributed Poisson with parameter τ) that type λ = γk of player i chooses
action j by pγijk. Denote the expected CH choice probability of player i
choosing action j by pτij =
∑∞
k=0 p
τ
ijkf(k) and the expected γ−TQRE choice
probability of player i choosing action j by pγij =
∑∞
k=0 p
γ
ijkf(k). Denote
∆τ,γ =
∑n
i=1
∑Ji
j=1(p
τ
ij − pγij)2.
Theorem 3: Fix τ . For almost all finite games Γ and for any ε > 0, there
exists γ such that ∆τ,γ < ε for all γ > γ.
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Proof: See appendix.
This limiting discretized TQRE shares the features of best response, and
hierarchichal beliefs that characterize CH.
Subjective
HQRE
TQRE
Discretized
TQRE
CH
HQRE
QRE
θ ∞, so
Fij(λ | λi) = Fj(λ)
Each Fi(λ) has a 
mass point at λ*
Fij(λ | λi) = Fj(λ)/Fj(θ(λi))
for λ < θ(λi) 
λ = 0,γ,2γ,…
γ∞ and
f(k) is Poisson
Figure 1. All of the models considered are special or limiting cases of
subjective HQRE. The relationships among the models are depicted.
Thus, we have created a “family tree” surrounding HQRE. The most
general model is subjective HQRE. When all subjectivity takes the form of
truncation at a player’s θλi, we have TQRE. From TQRE there are two
branches to follow. If we send θ → ∞, then the subjectivity vanishes, and
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we have HQRE. From there, a limiting distribution that places all mass
at one value of lambda corresponds to standard QRE. Following the other
branch from TQRE corresponds to discretizing TQRE so that λ takes on
a countable set of values, Lγ = {0, γ, 2γ, ..., kγ, ...}. Sending γ → ∞, and
assuming a Poisson distribution on F (k) then yields the standard CH model.
Another interesting special case of TQRE is when θ = 1 and k →∞. The
restriction θ = 1 means that 1-step (k = 1) players are best-responding to a
mixture of choices by their own types and some random (0-step, λ = 0) types.
Under these restrictions, in games with strict Nash equilibria, if F (0) is small
enough (there are too few random types to induce the QRE types away from
the Nash strategies), and k →∞ (the QRE types best respond), the model
is a “noisy Nash” model which has been used in previous applications as a
benchmark that illuminates the empirical importance of quantal response.
16.
4 Experimental evidence
??
4.1 Games and design
We explored the fit of different HQRE and CH models in 17 complete-
information normal form games, and one game with information asymmetry
(discussed in Section ?? below). Table A1 in Appendix 2 presents the payoff
matrices of all 17 games and the relative choice frequencies from our data.
The data from the row and column roles are combined in the symmetric
games, since they are strategically equivalent.
One game is an “unprofitable” game (Morgan and Sefton, 2002) in which
maximin strategies do not form an equilibrium, yet guarantee the same pay-
offs as equilibrium strategies. Twelve games are affine transformations of
games created by Stahl and Wilson (1995) (SW) to fit models of iterated
strategic thinking (which are precursors to CH that include more types). We
changed some design details about how the games were presented, to see how
robust the patterns of play were to such details, and to avoid focal points.17
16See, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), El-Gamal, McKelvey and Palfrey
(1993), and Fey, McKelvey and Palfrey (1996)
17The main difference is the payoff transformation. This was done to eliminate possible
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These games were chosen because there is a high proportion of Nash play
in some of the games in the original SW sample, but the CH model cannot fit
those data because the Nash strategy is not reached by iterations of thinking
steps with best response (see Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004). These games
are interesting to study since one of our goals is to identify strategic aspects
in which some models make better predictions than others. Game 8 from
SW is a good example.
A B C Data QRE CH
A 11, 11 59, 91 51, 51 0.17 0.11 0.33
B 91, 59 27, 27 51, 43 0.20 0.25 0.33
C 51, 51 43, 51 53, 53 0.63 0.64 0.33
λ = 1.05 τ = 0.0
S-W 8
Table 1. Game 8 from SW, along with empirical choice frequencies and the
optimal predictions of QRE and CH.
Table 1 shows the payoff matrix of our game based on SW 8. The three
columns following the payoff matrix list the empirical choice frequencies, and
the predictions of QRE and CH, based on their fitted parameter values. We
find an optimal λ∗ = 1.05, which generates predictions that are close to the
observed play. In contrast, the best fitting parameter for CH is τ ∗ = 0.0, with
corresponding uniformly random behavior. That is, no other parameteriza-
tion of CH fits better than random choice, and the model is not consistent
with the relative choice frequencies in our data in this sense. As stated,
the reason for this relates to the fact that equilibrium strategies can not be
focal payoffs, such as 0 and 100, that appear in the original SW games. Instead, our payoffs
are scaled so that all entries are two-digit numbers. We also included 4 games that were
neither symmetric nor 3x3. Another difference is the matching protocol. We implemented
a standard random matching procedure, whereas SW match each choice against the empir-
ical distribution of others’ choices. Also, we paid subjects exactly according to the payoff
tables instead of using the lottery procedure of SW. Finally, our games were presented
sequentially, without the possibility of changing choices in previous games, whereas SW
allowed subjects to revise all decisions before submitting their choices.
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reached through a process of iterated thinking, whereas the empirical choice
probabilities show a strong tendency towards equilibrium, as evidenced by
the relatively large value of λ that we estimate in QRE. Recall that QRE con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium as λ increases and players become completely
payoff responsive.
Four games involve “cloning”—presenting the same pure strategy more
than once. These games are included because QRE and CH models can
respond differently to the addition of cloned strategies. It is well-known that
in stochastic choice models, splitting a single strategy into two equivalent
strategies increases the predicted probability of play (the two split strategy
frequencies are generally higher than the single strategy frequency) unless
some hierarchical structure is imposed.18 This property can lead to different
predictions in QRE and CH approaches, since a cloned strategy does not
necessarily receive more weight in CH (except for 0-level players) as players
best respond, rather than quantal respond, in CH.
One of our games with cloned strategies is asymmetric matching pennies,
where “down” is cloned for the row player and “right” is cloned for the col-
umn player, creating a 3 × 3 game. The payoff matrix is given in Table 2,
along with observed choice frequencies, and the predictions from QRE and
CH calculated at the best fitting parameter values. Notice the reversal in
prediction quality of the two models relative to SW 8. QRE consistently
overestimates the frequency of cloned strategy play.19 In addition, the data
show too much “up” and “left” play relative to Nash equilibrium, a phe-
nomenon that the CH model does a better job of accounting for, due party
to the fact that these strategies are best responses to the uniform play of
level 0’s.
Another game with cloned strategies is the “Joker game” of O’Neill
(1987), which was originally designed to allow a clean test of minimax play.
18In multinomial logit modelling this property is called the “red bus, blue bus” problem.
This term comes from early transportation applications predicting whether commuters
would drive or take a bus to work. The choice between {drive,bus} and {drive,red bus,
blue bus} can be different if choice is stochastic. For example, if people choose randomly
then there is a 12 probability they will take the bus in the first choice set and a
2
3 of taking
the bus in the second choice set. A large literature on hierarchical models with nesting
has emerged to take care of this problem, by treating the choice between {drive,bus} as a
top-level choice and the choice between {red bus, blue bus}, conditional on choosing bus,
as a second-level choice (where P (bus) = P (redbus) + P (bluebus)).
19In this game, CH also overestimates the amount of cloned play, but it is not significant,
and it is a much smaller magnitude than the error of QRE.
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L R R Data QRE CH
U 50, 10 10, 20 10, 20 0.78 0.51 0.73
D 10, 20 20, 10 20, 10 0.10 0.24 0.14
D 10, 20 20, 10 20, 10 0.12 0.24 0.14
Data 0.71 0.22 0.07
QRE 0.33 0.34 0.34 λ = 0.12
CH 0.50 0.25 0.25 τ = 0.90
Cloned Matching Pennies
Table 2. The matching pennies game where “bottom” is cloned for the row
player and “right” is cloned for the column player, along with empirical
choice frequencies and the optimal predictions of QRE and CH.
The payoff matrix is depicted in the lower right of Table A1, where the
first strategy (the joker card) has been cloned for the row player. Notice
that the row player’s frequency of the joker strategy is 14%, and the column
player’s choice frequency of the joker strategy is 38%, both below the Nash
equilibrium probability of 40%, which is predicted by QRE. The predicted
change from Nash to CH depends on the value of τ . At the pooles maximum
likelihood estimate, these probabilities are 23% and 32%, respectively. The
empirical frequencies are also lower than what was observed in the original
un-cloned O’Neill experiment (36% and 43%, respectively), where both QRE
and CH correctly predict the column player’s choice frequency to be above
the Nash equilibrium level of 40%.
Before proceeding to a more comprehensive analysis of our data, we briefly
summarize the design features. The experimental sessions took place at
Caltech and UCLA in April, 2004. There were four sessions, each consisting
of 25 rounds of the betting game and one shot each of the 17 matrix games,
with each ordering of the two parts done twice. The sessions had 16, 18, 20,
and 20 subjects each, resulting in a total of 1210 observations in the matrix
games20 and 1850 observations of the betting game. Subjects consisted of
20Due to technical problems, one session is missing data from games 3, 4 and 17, resulting
in a reduction of 3 · 16 = 48 observations.
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undergraduate students in the two institutions, and were randomly selected
to participate in the experiments. Upon arrival, students were seated at
random locations in the lab. Once in the lab, instructions were read aloud for
everyone to hear, and all subsequent interactions took place only through the
computers. During the phase of 17 matrix games, subjects were randomly
and anonymously rematched after each decision, and the same procedure
was used during the 25 repetitions of the betting game in order to minimize
possible repeated game effects. Average payoffs were $7.50 for the matrix
games and $8.95 for the betting game, resulting in an average total payoff of
$21.45 after including a $5.00 showup fee. Sessions lasted approximately 2
hours.
4.2 Complete information games
The first focus of our analysis is on estimation of the QRE, HQRE (assuming
an exponential f(λ)), discretized TQRE (assuming a Poisson distribution of
levels), and Poisson-CH models for the complete-information games. All
four models are estimated separately for each normal-form game, as well as
pooling data across games and estimating a single set of parameters for all
games.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the complete-information
games. Each column lists the best-fitting parameter value and negative log
likelihood for a particular model. The parameterizations are as follows: QRE
has a single λ∗ (i.e., this is HQRE with a single mass point at f(λ∗) = 1);
Poisson-CH has a mean number of thinking steps τ ; HQRE has an exponen-
tial distribution of response sensitivities with cumulative distribution func-
tion F (λ) = 1 − exp(−αλ), so it has a single parameter α to estimate; and
TQRE is discretized with grid size k and Poisson parameter τ (i.e., the prob-
ability that λi = jk is f(j) =
τ jE−τ
j!
, and a level j player has beliefs truncated
at jk).21
We use maximum likelihood to estimate the parameters of the models and
assess their qualities of fit. Each model has a single parameter, and makes a
unique statistical prediction in each game as a function of its parameter. At
21We also tried an HQRE model with a lognormal distribution of f(k), parameterized
by Gaussian mean µ and variance σ2, so that the mean and variance of the distribution are
controlled by separate variables. This model fit slightly better than exponential-HQRE
in SW games 5-6, 9-10, 13-14, and 16, (perhaps because it has two free parameters rather
than one), but the numerical computation did not converge for the other games.
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the aggregate level, our data consists of group-level choice counts for each
strategy of each game. Denote the empirical choice count of strategy j for
player i in game g by cijg, and denote model M ’s prediction of the frequency
at parameter value p by fMijg(p). We can express the log likelihood of model
M as a function of p by
lnLM(p) =
17∑
g=1
∑
i∈Ng
Jgi∑
j=1
cijg ln f
M
ijg(p). (7)
Maximizing LM(p) allows us to estimate the parameter for each model. The
results from this exercise appear near the bottom of Tabe 3, in the row
marked “Pooled,” to indicate that a single parameter is estimated across all
games. In addition, we estimate the parameters separately for each of the 17
games, simply by taking the likelihood function to consist only of the terms
corresponding to strategies from a particular game. That is,
lnLM(p, g) =
∑
i∈Ng
Jgi∑
j=1
cijg ln f
M
ijg(p). (8)
These results occupy the bulk of the table.
The first two columns of Table 3 are important for assessing the fits of
the models. The “random” log likelihood is the the likelihood that results
from a model that assumes every player randomizes uniformly in every game,
so that the choice frequency for player i in game g are simply 1/Jgi . This
number represents a lower bound on the quality of fit. The “empirical” log
likelihood results from a (hindsight) model that assigns to every strategy its
empirical frequency, that is, f eijg =
cijg∑
j′≤Jg
i
cij′g
. This is the model that results
in the best possible fit, and is therefore an upper bound on the quality of
fit for the models we consider. Thus, the random and empirical likelihoods
bracket the fitted likelihoods for all the models we consider.
In Camerer, Ho and Chong (2002) a more general form of f(k) is esti-
mated which allows each f(k), for 0 ≤ k ≤ 6, to be a free parameter. For
identification purposes, they impose the condition that the density f(k) must
be single-peaked. This more general form fits only very slightly better than
the Poisson distribution in the many games they estimate, suggesting that
a single-peaked distribution f(k) such as Poisson—which is parsimoniously
characterized by only one parameter, the mean and variance τ—is a good
18
Random Empirical
 neg Log L  neg Log L λ neg Log L τ neg Log L α neg Log L γ τ neg Log L
1 Unprofitable 81.30 73.12 0.06 75.97 10.19 73.65 0.07 75.93 0.35 3.73 73.12
2 Cloned MP 81.30 52.34 0.12 71.72 0.90 58.39 0.13 71.76 ∞ 0.90 58.39
3 Cloned SH (Low) 51.96 46.50 0.15 46.74 0.44 46.72 0.15 46.73 0.50 0.62 46.67
4 Cloned SH (Hi) 51.96 40.18 0.18 41.88 1.00 41.91 0.20 41.88 0.89 1.40 40.65
5 SW 1 81.30 39.55 0.13 41.51 3.10 40.92 0.36 39.56 0.17 2.66 39.93
6 SW 2 81.30 46.00 0.13 46.75 5.59 46.03 0.25 47.04 ∞ 5.59 46.03
7 SW 3 81.30 53.26 0.07 73.94 0.72 63.26 0.10 73.03 ∞ 0.72 63.26
8 SW 4 81.30 55.02 ∞ 56.40 1.96 56.11 ∞ 56.40 ∞ 1.96 56.11
9 SW 5 81.30 79.27 0.14 80.50 0.00 81.30 0.17 80.25 0.00 0.00 81.30
10 SW 6 81.30 79.54 0.05 80.86 1.27 79.69 0.06 80.83 0.11 2.81 79.54
11 SW 7 81.30 73.69 ∞ 73.73 0.67 73.73 ∞ 73.73 ∞ 0.67 73.73
12 SW 8 81.30 70.76 0.98 73.25 0.00 81.30 1.38 73.04 0.02 51.30 78.30
13 SW 9 81.30 54.30 0.08 66.56 1.01 60.94 0.10 66.61 ∞ 1.01 60.94
14 SW 10 81.30 73.12 0.42 73.17 13.90 77.35 0.52 73.14 0.15 7.13 73.31
15 SW 11 81.30 73.81 0.17 74.55 0.83 73.82 0.22 74.47 0.17 0.93 73.81
16 SW 12 81.30 66.81 0.03 72.94 0.94 67.02 0.05 72.19 0.16 0.87 66.81
17 Cloned Joker 86.88 77.28 0.16 83.62 0.83 81.08 0.20 83.65 ∞ 0.82 81.07
Sum 1329.00 1054.55 — 1134.08 — 1103.21 — 1130.24 — — 1092.96
Pooled — — 0.10 1192.00 0.53 1239.26 0.15 1180.25 0.11 1.57 1164.41
TQRE
Matrix Game Estimates
Game # Game
QRE CH HQRE
Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates for the matrix games. The
“Random” and “Empirical” scores represent upper and lower bounds on the
negative log likelihoods achievable by the four models.
reduced-form placeholder for more general single-peaked distributions, in fit-
ting experimental data. We adopt this approach in our estimation of CH, as
well as HQRE and TQRE.22
There are two central features of Table 3. First, while the parameter val-
ues for each model are reasonably similar across games, all models have one
or more games with outlying values. For example, two QRE λ estimates are
infinite (Nash equilibrium) and four CH τ values are either zero (correspond-
ing to random choice) or implausibly high (above 10).23 At the same time,
the fit for all models degrades significantly when a single parameter config-
22For HQRE, we use an exponential distribution.
23Because the CH model has best response (except for 0-step types), the likelihood
surface is potentially discontinuous and very jagged. Small changes in τ will change
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uration is estimated for all games pooled, compared to estimating separate
parameters game-by-game. This can be seen in the table by comparing the
likelihoods in the last two rows, marked “Sum” and “Pooled.” The decline
in fit is least bad for HQRE, and substantially worse for CH relative to QRE
(and HQRE). For HQRE, the likelihood ratio versus the random model de-
clines from 199 to 149. This decline is greatest for CH, where it falls from 226
to 90. Thus, while CH provides the best fit when game-specific parameters
are estimated, it provides the worst fit if the parameters are constrained to
be constant across games.
The second conclusion is that despite their important structural differ-
ences, game-by-game and overall fits of the different models are surprisingly
close. The QRE and CH fits differ by five or more likelihood points in only
five of 17 games. Not surprisingly, TQRE also fits about as well as both
QRE and CH, and slightly better in many cases, since it contains structural
elements of both models. Our prior expectation was that the models would
be widely separated in many of these games, but they are generally not. The
surprise here is not that the models differ, but that they differ by so little in
most of these games.
A final observation concerns the discretized TQRE estimates. In 7 of the
17 games we estimate γ = ∞, in which case the TQRE model collapses to
Cognitive Hierarchy. This is interesting because TQRE incorporates both
QRE and CH features, and in some cases the estimates show that there is no
positive effect (as far as likelihoods) to adding a quantal response element to
the standard CH model. For 3 of these 7 games, there is also no improvement
over QRE, but in the remaining 4, CH is clearly the better fitting model.
Also notice that HQRE and QRE offer nearly identical fits in many cases.
Under a general distributional assumption for HQRE, it nests QRE (at least
asymptotically), and so the HQRE fit would necessarily be better. How-
ever, under the exponential distribution we estimate here, the models are
not nested because there is necessarily heterogeneity in HQRE.24 As the
parameter describing the mean responsiveness increases, the variance in re-
sponsiveness necessarily increases as well. Thus the two models are indeed
substantially different. Our results indicate that this heterogeneity neither
improves nor degrades the fit.
the pattern of choices for many step-k types which produces large changes in predicted
aggregate frequencies, and hence in log likelihood for any particular set of data. As a
result, values of τ that are quite far apart can produce similar log likelihoods.
24A log normal specification would nest QRE.
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Table 3 makes clear that QRE and CH have surprisingly small differences
in their qualities of fit for the game-by-game estimates. To see this relation-
ship in another way, consider Figure 2. Each point corresponds to a single
strategy from one of the 17 matrix games. The horizontal axis plots empirical
choice frequencies for the strategies, and the vertical axis plots the predicted
choice frequencies from the models at the pooled parameter estimate. QRE
predictions are shown in red and CH in blue. For a perfect fitting model, like
the “empirical” model shown in Table 3, all points would fall on the 450 line,
shown in black. Of course, both QRE and CH show substantial deviations
from this line. Both models are also “biased” in the direction of underpre-
dicting extreme frequencies. That is, the models put too much weight on
strategies that are empirically played the least often, and too little weight
on strategies that are played the most often. This can be seen by looking
at the red and blue lines, which show the best fitting lines to the scatter
plots from tho models. Both lines have positive intercept and slope less than
unity. Perhaps most interestingly, the fitted lines are almost identical, and
can barely be distinguished in the figure.
4.3 The negative frequency-payoff deviation relation
This surprising similarity in fit of models led us to think about whether the
models might share some deeper structural properties. Note that in QRE,
by construction, strategies with larger, more costly, deviations from optimal
response (measured by expected payoffs) are played less often. To illustrate
this property, start with the best-fitting QRE parameter λ∗ for a game. Then
calculate both the predicted frequency of play of each strategy, and the ex-
pected payoff deviation from each strategy according to the model, relative
to the optimal strategy. That is, calculate the expected loss assuming that
other players’ choice frequencies are described given by the model. Figure
3 plots these predicted frequencies, on the y-axis, against expected payoff
deviations (in pennies), for all strategies in all 14 symmetric games.25 The
scatter plot shows a clear downward slope, which means that bigger mistakes
are made less frequently.26
Figure 4 shows the same frequency-deviation plot, constructed instead
25We restrict attention to the symmetric games because in our data they are exactly
the games that are 3× 3. Thus the frequencies are more comparable across games.
26Note that if we made a separate plot for each game, the points would necessarily move
monotonically downward by construction.
21
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 2. Each point represents one strategy from one of the complete
information games. Empirical choice frequencies are plotted on the
horizontal axis, and predicted frequencies from pooled estimates of the
models are on the vertical axis. QRE is shown in red, and CH in blue. The
black line is the 450, which corresponds to a perfect fit, and the red and blue
lines are the fits to the QRE and CH scatters. The fits are almost identical,
and in both cases are flatter than the 450.
using the actual data from each game. That is, given a particular data set,
one can compute expected payoffs from each strategy assuming that others
use the empirical choice frequencies, and then compute expected deviations
from the strategy that is ex post empirically optimal. To make this precise,
denote empirical choice frequencies of player i by hi = {hi1, . . . , hiJi}. The
collection h = {hi} of choice frequencies for each player then defines ex
post expected payoffs U eij(h) =
∑
a−i∈A−i(Πk 6=ihk(ak))ui(aij, a−i). Denote
i’s optimal strategy by j∗(i) = argmaxj≤Ji U
e
ij. Then the expected cost of
playing strategy j is U eij∗(i)−U eij. Of course, the empirically-optimal strategy
produces a zero deviation and is played frequently. The basic pattern that is
seen in the QRE plot—small mistakes (or zero mistakes) are common, and
large mistakes are rare—is also evident in the empirical frequency plot.
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Figure 3. QRE predicted choice frequencies computed at best fitting λ
(vertical axis) for each strategy of each symmetric game, versus expected
payoff cost in pennies, according to the model (horizontal axis).
As an example consider game 16, which is SW 12. Table 3 gives a QRE
estimate of λ∗ = 0.03. At the QRE estimate the predicted choice frequencies
are (37%, 19%, 44%). These result in expected payoffs of (56.7, 36.9, 61.4).
Thus the expected deviation costs are 4.7, 24.5, and 0, respectively. The three
points that game 16 contributes to Figure 1 are therefore (0, 0.44), (4.7, 0.37),
and (24.5, 0.19). On the other hand the empirical choice frequencies are
(22%, 15%, 63%), which generate expected utilities of (62.3, 31.4, 63.0) for the
3 actions. The corresponding expected costs of deviation are (0.07, 31.6, 0).
Notice that while there are substantial differences between the empirical num-
bers and the QRE predictions (recall that the QRE estimate is fairly small
for this game), the ordering is preserved both in terms of choice frequen-
cies and expected payoffs. Thus the points contributed to Figure 2 are in a
qualitatively similar pattern to those for Figure 1.
Now consider the CH model. A negative relationship between the fre-
quency of strategy choices and their payoff deviations is not a structural
component of the CH model. The reason is that mistakes in CH which lead to
payoff deviations result from mistaken beliefs about the distribution of play,
not from quantal response. As the number of thinking steps k increases, the
23
5 10 15 20 25 30
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 4. Empirical choice frequencies for each strategy of each symmetric
game (vertical axis), versus expected payoff cost in pennies, computed from
the empirical distribution of play (horizontal axis).
accuracy of conditional beliefs improves, but there is no guarantee that the
strategy choices for k-step thinkers will have expected payoffs that always
increase with k. However, Figure 5 plots the frequency-deviation plot for
the CH model, using best-fitting τ ∗ values (as in the QRE plot). The down-
ward slope evident in the QRE (Figure 3) and empirical frequency (Figure
4) graphs is also evident in the CH graph (Figure 5), which looks remarkably
like the QRE graph, even though the frequency-deviation decline is not built
into CH as it is in QRE.
One way to understand the surprising frequency-deviation link in CH
is to think about the extreme thinking-step types. Zero-step thinkers will
randomize across strategies, so their predicted frequencies will be the same for
all deviations (i.e., their frequency-deviation profile does not slope downward,
but it does not slope upward either). If the model is correct, the highest-step
thinkers are playing the optimal strategy, because they have correct beliefs
(their truncated beliefs about lower-type frequencies approximate the true
distribution closely enough to generate the optimal strategy); those higher-
step players will play only optimal strategies with zero deviation. Adding
only these two extreme types together will produce a frequency-deviation
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Figure 5. CH predicted choice frequencies computed at best fitting λ
(vertical axis) for each strategy of each symmetric game, versus expected
payoff cost in pennies, according to the model (horizontal axis).
plot that is weakly downward-sloping. Although there is no mathematical
guarantee that adding in intermediate types will generate a strictly declining
profile (as is true for QRE), Figure 3 nonetheless suggests that in practice
the relation between frequency and deviation is usually negative.
Summarizing, the empirical frequencies of strategy play are typically de-
clining in the deviation between a strategy’s expected payoff (given the data)
and the payoff of the empirically-optimal strategy. QRE reproduces this
property by construction. CH also reproduces this property empirically, al-
though it does not generally hold for all games. This gives one intuitive
reason why CH and QRE approaches fit data about equally well, despite
their structural difference. Also recall Figure 2, which shows that at an ag-
gregate level, the two models make extremely similar predictions across our
games.
We remark that the negative frequency-deviation relationship does not
always hold in CH. An example where it is violated is game 14, SW 10. We
find an estimate of τ ∗ = 13.9 for CH. Based on the corresponding choice
predictions, level zero players, who randomize, earn an expected payoff of
38.1. This is better than level one players, who best respond to the uniform
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mixture. This results in playing strategy 3, which earns an expected payoff
of 36.9 against the true (according to the model) distribution of play. In fact,
there are multiple instances where a level j player does better than a level
j + 1 player in this example, because there are many cases where adjacent
level players choose different actions.
4.4 The betting game and learning
We also studied a zero-sum betting game with asymmetric information over
four states, used by Sonsino, Erev and Gilat (2001) and replicated by Sovik
(2004). The game is shown in Table 4. Player 1 has two information parti-
tions, {A,B} and {C,D}. Player 2 has three partitions, {A}, {B,C}, and
{D}. Note that if the state is A or D, player 2 knows the state with certainty.
The prior on the states is uniform. Players choose whether to “bet” or “not
bet”. If both players bet, their payoffs are determined as in the top panel
of Table 4. If at least one player opts out, then a paper-rock-scissors (PRS)
game was played, with payoffs of 49, 23, and 36, for win, lose, and draw, re-
spectively. This game has a unique equilibrium in which players randomize
uniformly and have an expected payoff of 36. The reason for including the
game is to avoid bias in presenting the betting game. The worry is that if the
outside option consisted of a certain amount, then subjects may be tempted
to over-bet, either because it is “more interesting,” or out of belief that the
experiment would not make sense if they were meant to repeatedly not bet.
This game tests the ”Groucho Marx Theorem” (Milgrom and Stokey,
1982)—the idea that privately-informed players should never agree to a zero-
sum bet in equilibrium. With these payoffs, player 2 loses by betting on A,
and wins by betting on D. As a result, although a CH 1-step risk-neutral
player 1 will bet if her information is {A,B} (thinking she is equally likely
to win 31 or lose 29, relative to the expectation of PRS), in equilibrium she
will never win since a rational player 2 will know the state if it is A, and
won’t bet. Hence if player 1 guesses that player 2 is rational, she won’t bet
if her information is {A,B} because she deduces that she will never win the
31 and might lose 29. By similar logic, if player 2 is rational, thinks player
1 is rational, and thinks that player 2 thinks she (player 1) is rational, she
can deduce that player 1 won’t bet if player 1’s information is {A,B}; player
2 therefore will not bet if her information is {B,C}, since she can only lose
by so doing. One more step of iterated reasoning leads player 1 to not bet
if her information is {C,D}. So there will be no state in which both players
26
A B C D
Player 1 67 7 55 19
Player 2 3 63 15 51
Empirical A B C D
Betting Player 1
Frequencies Player 2 5.5% 96.7%
QRE A B C D
Betting Player 1 λ = 0.64
Frequencies Player 2 20.1% 70.9% neg Log L = 1085.4
CH A B C D
Betting Player 1 τ = 3.09
Frequencies Player 2 2.3% 97.7% neg Log L = 1074.238.0%
Payoffs
25.1% 37.1%
46.0%
16.3% 60.4%
28.5%
44.7%
41.2%
Betting Game
Table 4. The betting game payoffs (top), the empirical percentage of the
time players chose “bet” by information set (second panel), and the QRE
and CH predictions at their maximum likelihood estimates (third and fourth
panels, respectively).
agree to bet, if players are sufficiently confident about rationality of others,
and about others’ perceptions of rationality.27
However, Sonsino et al (2001) and Sovik (2004) find that players do bet,
even after many periods of experience. In most of the Sonsino treatments,
however, the marginal incentive is quite low; because they ran many periods,
they used a low per-period conversion rate from experimental currency to
Israeli Shekels (at stake was roughly 2.4 US cents per observation). In early
periods a surprising fraction of player 2’s bet when they are sure to lose in
27The iterated reasoning here is different from level k reasoning in CH models.
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{A} (around 20%) or don’t bet in {D} when they are sure to win (around
20% do not bet). This game was therefore included with some design changes
to test the robustness of betting to higher incentives and other changes.
The main design change is that players who choose not to bet play a
mixed-equilibrium game with expected value of 36 instead. This helped
control for possible demand effects favoring betting, and also approximates
the psychic value of betting with playing a mixed-equilibrium game in which
the outcome is also uncertain.28 One anomaly in our data is that in the
betting game, one of four states is to be drawn for each match, with equal
probability. In our data the counts for the four states are (183, 242, 255, 245).
The number of times state A is drawn is significantly smaller than 1
4
.
In the betting game, CH and QRE both predict positive amounts of
betting in all information partitions. Table 4 (bottom two panels) shows
predicted betting rates for both models, using parameters estimated from
our data across all periods (λ∗ = 0.64, τ ∗ = 3.09). Both models predict
substantial betting when the information partitions contain two states, but
the predictions are not sufficiently different that the data could point to one
theory over the other. We played the game in 25 repeated rounds per session
to see how quickly learning occurs (as do Sonsino et al (2001) and Sovik
(2004)).
Figure 6 shows betting rates across time for both players, aggregating
over four-period blocks. As with the Sonsino et al (2001) and Sovik (2004)
results, our data show that betting is common and is slow to be extinguished
by learning. However, our initial betting rates are significantly lower than
Sonsion et al (2001), showing more levels of sophisticated reasoning, a differ-
ence due perhaps to our attempt to balance the design. Aggregating across
periods, as shown in Table 4, the fit of the QRE and CH models as measured
by negative log likelihood scores are 1085.4 for QRE and 1074.2 for CH. As in
the complete-information normal-form games reported earlier, the two mod-
els are about equally accurate. We also fit models in which the parameters
λ and τ drift up over time, as a reduced-form way of characterizing learning.
In QRE we estimate an initial λ0 = 0.55 with a time trend of 0.012, which
results in a negative log likelihood of 1083.5, an improvement of less than two
points. Allowing for the time trend generates a larger improvement in CH.
28Sonsino et al (2001) also included one treatment in which there was a small fixed
payment for not betting, which did not reduce betting rates. However, a fixed payment
treatment does not control for a taste for gambling or risk-preference.
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Figure 6. Betting percentages for the different information sets of the two
roles in the betting game. Each point represents a 4-period moving average.
We estimate τ 0 = 2.5 with a time trend of 0.017, which has a correspond-
ing negative log likelihood of 1061.6, an improvement of over twelve points.
These results reinforce the central conclusion above, that despite their struc-
tural difference the QRE and CH approaches fit about equally well. Allowing
reduced-form learning in either model improves fit about equally well.
5 Conclusion
The quantal response equilibrium (QRE) approach in games assumes that
players “better-respond”—choosing strategies with higher expected payoffs
more often—but do not necessarily best-respond by choosing the highest
expected-payoff strategy all the time. (It is a fusion of Nash equilibrium with
Luce’s (1959) stochastic utility model.) Cognitive hierarchy (CH) models go
in a different direction; in the Poisson-CH form of Camerer, Ho and Chong
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(2004), players iterate reasoning in discrete steps but players doing one or
more steps of iterated reasoning choose best responses given their beliefs.
Both models have been shown to explain deviations from Nash equilibrium
in many experimental datasets, and also explain why the Nash model fits
well in some experiments (Goeree and Holt, 2001; Camerer, Ho and Chong,
2004).
We introduce a hierarchical form of QRE, called HQRE, which creates a
family of models that include QRE and CH as special cases. In HQRE, there
are a distribution of response sensitivities, f(λ); players know this distribu-
tion and optimize (given their λ values) accordingly. If f(λ) is a degenerate
distribution around one value of λ then HQRE is equivalent to QRE. If a
player i with λi has subjective beliefs about the distribution g(λ|λi), the
resulting model is subjective HQRE. The clear link....TOBE COMPLETED
TBA: Some discussion of general functional forms (besides logit) and
extensive form
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of existence of HQRE
Theorem 1: In finite games, a Heterogeneous Logit Equilibrium exists.
Proof: To define the fixed point mapping, we take a slightly different ap-
proach from the standard one. Rather than identify a mapping, the fixed
points of which are equilibria, we consider a fixed point in the induced mixed
strategies, and then an equilibrium is constructed from the induced mixed
strategies using (??). This simplifies the existence theorem because we are
finding a fixed point in ∆A, a compact convex subset of <m rather than in
a function space.
Let α ∈ ∆A. We construct the mapping Σ : ∆A → ∆A in the following
way. Using (??), U : ∆A → <m maps α into U(α), where m = ∑ni=1 J i.
Using (??), for each i, Pi : <Ji × [0,∞) → ∆Ai maps Ui into ∆Ai for each
λi ∈ [0,∞). Finally, using (??), for each i, σi maps Pi(Ui(α)) into ∆Ai by
taking expectations over λi according to the distribution Fi. We define Σ =
Σ1 × ... × Σn by the composed mapping Σi = σi ◦ Pi ◦ Ui ◦ α. To see that
this has a fixed point, observe that Ui is a single-valued, bounded continuous
function on ∆A. Furthermore, Pi is single valued, continuous and uniformly
bounded and hence
∫∞
0
Pi(λi;Ui)dFi(λi) exists for all Ui. Therefore, σi(Pi) is
well defined, and continuous by Lebegue’s dominated convergence theorem.
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Hence Σ is a continuous function from ∆A into itself and has a fixed point
σ∗ ∈ Σ. For each i and each λi ∈ [0,∞), let:
p
∗
ij(λi) =
eλiUij(σ∗)∑Ji
k=1 e
λiUik(σ∗)
.
so p
∗
is a Heterogeneous Logit Equilibrium. QED
Theorem 2: In finite games, a TQRE exists.
Proof: To define the fixed point mapping, we take a slightly different ap-
proach than above, because player i’s beliefs about other players’ strategies
depends on λi. Rather than finding a fixed point in ∆A, a compact con-
vex subset of <m, we find a fixed point in distributional strategies, where a
distributional strategy for i, σi, is a probability measure on the subsets of
[0,∞)×Ai, the type-action product space, since in our approach i′s type is
λi ∈ [0,∞). The proof is a straightforward adaptation of Milgrom and Weber
(1982). The only two differences are: (1) players have truncated expectations
rather than rational expectations; and (2) players quantal respond according
to the logit rule instead of best responding.
Payoffs are equicontinuous because each Ai is finite. Because of the trun-
cated distribution of beliefs, the (ex ante) expected payoff to player i is then
defined slightly differently from Milgrom and Weber (p. 624), the differ-
ence being that the integral with respect to the distribution of other player
types (λ−i) is truncated at θi(λi) for each type λi. Since our distribution
of types is independent and a density function exists for each fi, and be-
cause θi(λi) varies continously in λi, absolute continuity is satisfied, so we
can express expected payoffs almost exactly as in Milgrom and Weber (1982,
p. 625, expression 3.1), except for the well-behaved dependence of the up-
per bound for types λ−i on λi. Consequently, using the topology of weak
convergence for the distributional strategies, strategy sets are convex com-
pact metric spaces and payoff functions are continuous and linear, so a fixed
point exists by Glicksberg’s theorem (1952). The fact that we are considering
quantal responses rather than best responses is of no consequence. It simply
means that the fixed-point correspondence is single-valued and continuous
rather than being multi-valued and upper hemicontinuous. QED
Theorem 3: Fix τ . For almost all finite games Γ and for any ε > 0, there
exists γ¯ such that ∆τ,γ < ε for all γ > γ¯.
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Proof: Fix τ and let Γτ denote the set of finite games with the property
that in the CH model with parameter τ there is a unique best reply for all
levels k ≥ 1. It is straightforward to show that for each n and for each
J , where J is the maximum size of any of the n players’ strategy sets, the
set of games without these properties has Lebesgue measure 0. Since the
countable union of measure 0 sets has measure 0, this implies that Γτ consists
of almost all finite games, in the generic sense. Let g ∈ Γτ . Denote the
unique maximizing action of a level k type of player i by aτik, and let δ
τ
k
be the smallest difference in expected utility for a level k type of player i
between choosing aτik and any other pure strategy. Fix ε > 0 and let L
be an integer sufficiently large such that
∑∞
k=L
τk
k!
e−τ < ε
3IJ
. Denote p¯τijL =∑L
k=0 p
τ
ijk
τk
k!
e−τ and p¯γijL =
∑L
k=0 p
γ
ijk
τk
k!
e−τ . We immediately obtain that
|p¯τijL − p¯τij| < ε3IJ for all i, j. Hence
∑n
i=1
∑Ji
j=1(p¯
τ
ij − p¯τijL)2 < ε3 . Simlarly,∑n
i=1
∑Ji
j=1(p¯
γ
ij − p¯γijL)2 < ε3 for any γ.Note that for each i and k, pτijk = 0
except if j is the index corresponding to action aτik. Next, we wish to examine
p¯γij, for large γ. First, we show that there exists a number γ¯(L) such that for
all γ ≥ γ¯(L), aτik is the unique maximizing action for all types 1 ≤ k ≤ L
and pγiaτikL
> 1 − ε
3ILJ
for all k ≤ L. That is, if γ ≥ γ¯(L) then for all types
L or lower types of player i, |p¯τijL − p¯γijL| < ε3LJ for all j ∈ Si. The proof
is recursive. It is true for level 1 types because they have the same beliefs
about other players that the CH-level-1 players have, and therefore have the
same unique maximizing strategy aτ1. Therefore, by choosing a large enough
γ we can make the probability a level 1 type of player i chooses aτi1, as close
to 1 as we wish. In particular, we can find some γ¯(1) so that it is greater
than 1 − ε
3ILJ
for all γ ≥ γ¯(1). Level 2 (and higher) types are only slightly
more complicated. For the level 2 types, their optimal strategy will be aτ2
as long as the probability level 1’s of the players other than i play aτ−i1 is
sufficiently close to 1. This will be true for all γ greater than some number,
call it γ̂(1). Hence, we can find a γ¯(2) such that the probability a level 1 type
of player i chooses aτi2 is greater than 1 − ε3ILJ for all γ ≥ γ¯(2). Proceeding
recursively, we can do the same for level 3 and higher types, and so forth all
the way to level L types. By construction,
∑n
i=1
∑Ji
j=1( p¯
τ
ijL − p¯γijL)2 < ε3 for
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all γ ≥ γ¯(L). Finally, by the triangle inequality:
∆τ,γ =
n∑
i=1
Ji∑
j=1
(p¯τij − p¯γij)2
≤
n∑
i=1
Ji∑
j=1
(p¯τij − p¯τijL)2 +
n∑
i=1
Ji∑
j=1
(p¯τijL − p¯γijL)2 +
n∑
i=1
Ji∑
j=1
(p¯γijL − p¯γij)
<
ε
3
+
ε
3
+
ε
3
for all γ ≥ γ¯(L)
< ε
QED
35
40, 40 60, 10 10, 40 0.33 35, 35 39, 63 95, 91 0.44
10, 60 10, 10 60, 40 0.24 63, 39 40, 40 56, 39 0.26
40, 10 40, 60 40, 40 0.43 91, 95 39, 56 15, 15 0.30
50, 10 10, 20 10, 20 0.78 37, 37 93, 45 53, 53 0.59
10, 20 20, 10 20, 10 0.10 45, 93 13, 13 85, 73 0.13
10, 20 20, 10 20, 10 0.12 53, 53 73, 85 36, 36 0.28
0.71 0.22 0.07
21, 21 10, 20 0.24 11, 11 59, 91 51, 51 0.17
21, 21 10, 20 0.17 91, 59 27, 27 51, 43 0.20
20, 10 20, 20 0.59 51, 51 43, 51 53, 53 0.63
0.34 0.66
31, 31 10, 20 0.45 50, 50 98, 44 70, 82 0.65
31, 31 10, 20 0.34 44, 98 38, 38 70, 18 0.04
20, 10 20, 20 0.21 82, 70 18, 70 70, 70 0.31
0.90 0.10
35, 35 39, 47 95, 40 0.11 47, 47 51, 44 28, 43 0.52
47, 39 51, 51 67, 15 0.81 44, 51 11, 11 43, 91 0.19
40, 95 15, 67 47, 47 0.07 43, 28 91, 43 11, 11 0.30
79, 79 51, 59 55, 59 0.80 41, 41 97, 45 35, 58 0.50
59, 51 31, 31 99, 67 0.15 45, 97 17, 17 53, 57 0.17
59, 55 67, 99 19, 19 0.06 58, 35 57, 53 33, 33 0.33
73, 73 13, 77 49, 93 0.15 50, 50 30, 36 74, 42 0.24
77, 13 41, 41 49, 41 0.17 36, 30 82, 82 18, 98 0.17
93, 49 41, 49 46, 46 0.69 42, 74 98, 18 62, 62 0.59
42, 42 58, 50 98, 46 0.61 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30 10, 30 0.07
50, 58 54, 54 26, 66 0.35 30, 10 10, 30 10, 30 10, 30 0.07
46, 98 66, 26 18, 18 0.04 10, 30 10, 30 30, 10 30, 10 0.17
10, 30 30, 10 10, 30 30, 10 0.28
10, 30 30, 10 30, 10 10, 30 0.41
0.38 0.34 0.17 0.10
21, 21 93, 13 45, 29 0.33
13, 93 69, 69 53, 53 0.28
29, 45 53, 53 61, 61 0.39
Cloned Stag Hunt (Low)
S-W 4
S-W 5
S-W 6
S-W 7
Cloned Stag Hunt (Hi)
S-W 1
S-W 2
S-W 3
Unprofitable
Cloned Matching Pennies
S-W 12
Cloned Joker
S-W 8
S-W 9
S-W 10
S-W 11
Table A1. Payoff matrices for the 17 normal form games, along with
empirical choice frequencies (the row and column roles are combined in
symmetric games).
36
